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Abstract
Group-based emotions are emotional reactions to group concerns and have been
shown to emerge when people appraise events while endorsing a specific social
identity. Here we investigate whether discussing a group-relevant event with other
group members affects emotional reactions in a similar way. In two experiments,
we confronted participants with an unfair group-relevant event, while manipulating
their social identity and whether they discussed the event or an unrelated topic.
Our major finding is that having group members discuss the unfair group-relevant
event led to emotions that were more negative than in the irrelevant discussion
and comparable to those observed when social identity had been made salient
explicitly beforehand. Moreover, it also generated group-based appraisals of
injustice (Experiment 1) and group-based identity (Experiment 2). This research
sheds new light not only on the consequences of within-group sharing of emotions
for the unfolding of intergroup relation...
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Group-based emotions are emotional reactions to group concerns and have been shown to emerge
when people appraise events while endorsing a specific social identity. Here we investigate whether
discussing a group-relevant event with other group members affects emotional reactions in a similar
way. In two experiments, we confronted participants with an unfair group-relevant event, while
manipulating their social identity and whether they discussed the event or an unrelated topic. Our
major finding is that having group members discuss the unfair group-relevant event led to emotions
that were more negative than in the irrelevant discussion and comparable to those observed when
social identity had been made salient explicitly beforehand. Moreover, it also generated group-based
appraisals of injustice (Experiment 1) and group-based identity (Experiment 2). This research sheds
new light not only on the consequences of within-group sharing of emotions for the unfolding of
intergroup relations but also on the nature of group-based emotions.
Keywords: Group-based emotions; Group-based appraisals; Self-categorisation; Social identity; Social
interaction.
In recent years there has been a considerable
amount of work on emotions in social contexts
(Parkinson, Fischer, &Manstead, 2004) and, more
specifically, in intergroup relations (for reviews, see
Iyer & Leach, 2008; Yzerbyt & Demoulin, 2010).
A most intriguing debate concerns the nature and
role of group-based emotions, that is, emotions
experienced on behalf of the group (Kuppens &
Yzerbyt, 2012, 2014; Smith, Seger, & Mackie,
2007; Yzerbyt, 2006). Interestingly, in most stud-
ies, participants report their emotions about some
event while being alone. Researchers have argued
that the psychological salience of people’s group
membership leads them to react to a situation in
terms of their social identity (Fischer, Haslam, &
Smith, 2010; Yzerbyt, Dumont, Wigboldus &
Gordijn, 2003). This, in turn, enables them to
take group goals into consideration and to experi-
ence group-based emotions, defined here as emo-
tional reactions to group concerns. Whereas
previous research has used explicit manipulations
of group membership to make social identity more
or less salient, the question is whether group-based
concerns can also affect emotional reactions in
other ways. The present research aims to compare
this to a more subtle and ecologically valid
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manipulation by instructing participants to talk
about an emotional topic that is either relevant or
irrelevant to group concerns.
Group-based emotions can be defined as emo-
tional reactions to group concerns. In an influential
chapter, E.R. Smith (1993) combined appraisal
models of emotions (e.g., Frijda, Kuipers, & Ter
Schure, 1989; C.A. Smith & Kirby, 2001) with
self-categorisation theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes,
Reicher, & Wheterell, 1987). To the extent that
their social identity is salient, people may appraise
the surrounding world not so much with regard to
their personal concerns but rather with respect to
group concerns. Smith presented his theory as a
new way of conceptualising prejudice and people’s
views about outgroups in intergroup relations (e.g.,
Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000). Yzerbyt and
colleagues (Gordijn, Wigboldus, & Yzerbyt,
2001; Kuppens & Yzerbyt, 2012; Yzerbyt,
Dumont, Mathieu, Gordijn, & Wigboldus, 2006)
extended Smith’s theoretical insight by putting a
stronger emphasis on the self-categorisation mech-
anism involved in group-based emotions. These
authors indeed found that varying the salience of a
particular group membership as opposed to
another changed the emotions reported by their
participants (Yzerbyt et al., 2003).
An important characteristic of these lines of
research is that after participants’ group member-
ship has been made salient, they are asked to
report their emotions in isolation. In real life,
however, social identity is rarely made salient in
such an explicit way. Rather, social identities are
often activated as a spontaneous by-product of
social interactions, such as discussing social or
emotional events with others (e.g., Peters,
Kashima, & Clark, 2008; Rimé, 2009). We expect
that to the extent that people talk to each other
about some event that affects a group they both
belong to, they may be particularly likely to notice
their shared predicament. As a result of talking
about their evaluation of the situation, they may
end up experiencing emotions that more readily
reflect group-based as opposed to more strictly
individual concerns.
The key question is thus whether group-based
emotions can also be affected by social interactions
with group members about the emotion-eliciting
event, even in the absence of explicit reminders of
one’s social identity. There are in fact several
reasons to think that this may be the case. First,
social interaction concerning emotional topics has
been found to increase group cohesion (Espitalier,
Tcherkassof, & Delmas, 2003). Second, emotion
sharing has been reported to lead to a shared
perspective because of emotion contagion and
social appraisals (Manstead & Fischer, 2001;
Mead, 1934) and thus to increase homogeneity
in the group. Third, social interaction would seem
to foster group-based cognition. One type of
group-based cognition is group consensus. Haslam
et al. (1998) showed that making the intergroup
context explicitly salient enhances stereotype con-
sensus. These authors predicted that social inter-
action would have a similar effect on consensus
because common group membership triggers
expectations to agree on issues relevant to the
shared identity. As expected, social interaction
increased stereotype consensus, and this effect
was especially robust for outgroup stereotypes
(Haslam et al., 1998; Stott & Drury, 2004;
Thompson, Judd, & Park, 2000). Crucially, social
interaction led to more ingroup stereotype con-
sensus only when the interaction occurred in an
intergroup context, that is, when it was preceded
by a discussion about the outgroup. Conceptually
similar effects were found by Stott and Drury
(2004), who additionally showed that group
interaction led to more negative stereotypes of
the outgroup and positive stereotypes of the
ingroup (see also Smith & Postmes, 2011). Social
interaction thus leads to more stereotype con-
sensus, but only when the social interaction occurs
in a context that renders the intergroup dimension
of the interaction relevant. In the two experiments
reported here, we therefore compare interaction on
a group-relevant theme versus an individual relev-
ant theme and expect that the group-relevant
theme will facilitate the experience of group-based
emotions.
To sum up, previous research has shown that
explicitly manipulating the salience of a particular
social identity can affect the emotions felt on
behalf of that group. Our question here is whether
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similar effects can be obtained in more subtle
ways, namely through social interaction with
group members. A discussion with fellow group
members on a topic involving concerns of one’s
common group can lead to a more group-based
perspective (or social identity salience) and this
group-based point of view may manifest itself in
emotions that reflect group-based concerns.
A recent study by Kuppens, Yzerbyt, Dan-
dache, Fischer, and van der Schalk (2013, Experi-
ment 2) showed that within-group interaction led
to more intense group-based indignation, but
there is a lack of evidence for the robustness and
the exact process leading to these results. In the
present effort, we again focus on situations in
which participants are not personally concerned by
the events, but only through their group member-
ship, in order to study group-based rather than
individual emotions. The current studies go bey-
ond previous results in two important ways. First,
we include an explicit manipulation of social
identity salience and a social interaction manip-
ulation in the same study in order to directly
compare their effects. In fact, we compare the
focal social interaction condition with two control
conditions in order to specify the boundary
conditions. Second, we include measures of spe-
cific group-based appraisals to highlight their
importance for group-based emotions.
In a first experiment, we wanted to examine
whether both the explicit focus on one’s social
identity and entering a discussion about a group-
relevant issue had equal power to trigger group-
based emotions. In a second experiment, we
wanted to replicate the findings while collecting
stronger evidence that the discussion generated
group-based emotions.
EXPERIMENT 1
The goal of Experiment 1 was to examine the
conditions under which interacting with a fellow
group member is able to fuel group-based emo-
tional reactions. We assigned participants ran-
domly to one of three conditions before they
learned about an unfair and harmful new policy
hitting a social group. A third of the participants
were initially led to see themselves as members of
the same group and then asked to discuss the
controversial policy with another participant in the
same condition (identity: group; discussion: relev-
ant). A second third of the participants were
induced to see themselves as individuals before
hearing about the policy affecting the group and
asked to discuss it with another participant in the
same condition (identity: individual; discussion:
relevant). A final third of the participants were
also induced to see themselves as individuals
before hearing about the policy but were then
asked to discuss an unrelated topic that concerned
them individually (identity: individual; discussion:
irrelevant).
We first expected a main effect of the relevance
of the topic discussed, such that participants
would feel more negatively when their discussion
concerned the controversial policy than when the
discussion concerned some other unrelated topic.
Second, whether participants were led to see
themselves as group members or individuals right
before the start of a discussion about the contro-
versial policy should not impact its outcome
because such a discussion has the effect that all
partners end up sharing the same group
perspective.
Method
We report how we determined our sample size, all
data exclusions, all manipulations and all measures
in the study.
Participants
A total of 71 pupils (53 female, 17 male and 1
unspecified gender; mean age: 17.59) in their last
year of high school took part in the experiment.
The size of the sample was determined on the
basis of the classes made available by the principal
and the time given to operate in the school. Seven
participants were excluded from further analyses
either because they were not native French speak-
ers or were not Belgian citizens.
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Procedure and design
In the classroom, participants learned that they
would take part in a study about some pending
decisions regarding students’ access to universities
in Belgium. There were three different versions of
our questionnaire. One third of participants was
assigned to the group member identity condition
and read that the study was about comparing their
reactions as future college students to those of
politicians. In order to ensure that participants in
the group member condition would activate their
group identity (for a similar procedure, see Yzerbyt
et al., 2003), they were asked to answer a series of
questions about their identification with future
college students. The remaining participants were
assigned to one of two individual identity condi-
tions and learned that the study concerned their
reactions as individuals. After reading these min-
imal instructions, all participants were asked to
report their experience with college administration
and their choice of college major. This was done
to render college education a salient issue for all
participants.
All participants were then asked to read a (fake)
newspaper excerpt. The alleged newspaper article
reported that the French-speaking authorities had
decided to implement a Dutch exam before
acceptance to college. This decision aimed at
reducing the number of non-Belgian students in
Belgian universities. This was depicted as a
relatively sudden decision, one which had pretty
dramatic consequences for non-Belgian students,
especially those who actually have few opportun-
ities to learn Dutch in their own country (in
Belgium, where Dutch is an official language,
most pupils have some Dutch classes during high
school). Whereas authorities allegedly explained
the non-discriminating nature of this decision,
student representatives were claiming the unfair-
ness of the policy and called for student mobilisa-
tion against the decision.
When they had finished reading the article, all
participants took part in a discussion in groups of
two. Participants in the group member identity
condition and half of participants in the individual
identity condition were invited to discuss the
content of the newspaper article (“group member
identity, relevant discussion” condition and “indi-
vidual identity, relevant discussion” condition,
respectively). The other half of the participants in
the individual condition were asked to discuss
their experience with college administration and
their choice of major (individual identity, irrelev-
ant discussion). Although the choice of major is
relevant to all future college students, it is not
something that affects them as a group and is
therefore unlikely to make the future college
student social identity salient.
After five minutes of discussion, participants
were requested to go back to their questionnaire
and to answer the remaining questions. Depend-
ing on condition, participants were reminded to
answer as individuals or as future college students.
The questions pertained to participants’ appraisal
of the event and their emotional reactions. For
exploratory purposes, we also enquired about the
emotional reactions attributed to other future
college students. For all participants, the last
page of the questionnaire measured a series of
control variables.
Dependent variables
Building upon Smith and Kirby’s (2001) appraisal
components, we used seven items to capture
participants’ appraisal of the controversial policy.
Specifically, we measured participants’ appraisals
of motivational relevance (i.e., “I feel concerned by
the selection procedure mentioned in the news‐
paper article”), motivational congruence (i.e., “The
selection procedure mentioned in the newspaper
article is something very negative for me” and
“I have the feeling that politicians do not care
about the life projects of future college students”),
other-agency (i.e., “I think that politicians are
clearly responsible for the selection procedure
mentioned in the newspaper article”), situational
coping potential (i.e., “I have the feeling that there
are ways to oppose the selection procedure men-
tioned in the newspaper article”), emotional cop-
ing potential (i.e., “I do not easily accept the idea
that the selection procedure mentioned in the
newspaper article will actually be implemented”)
YZERBYT, KUPPENS, MATHIEU
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and future expectancy (i.e., “Whatever we do, I’m
rather pessimistic regarding the suppression of the
selection procedure mentioned in the newspaper
article”). Because our predictions were focusing on
reactions of anger, we also included one item tapping
the appraisal of unfairness (i.e., “In my opinion, the
selection procedure mentioned in the newspaper
article is totally unfair”). Participants were invited to
indicate their answers on 7-point scales ranging
from 1 (= not at all) to 7 (= completely).
Emotional reactions
Eight emotional items were used in order to assess
participants’ emotional reactions of anger (angry,
revolted, r = .79), anxiety (anxious, preoccupied, r =
.60), sadness (resigned, downhearted, r = .25) and
happiness (joyful, satisfied, r = .74). They were all
answered on 7-point scales, ranging from 1 (= not
at all) to 7 (= completely). The same items were
used to measure the emotional reactions attributed
to the other future college students (anger: r = .81;
happiness: r = .69; sadness: r = .59; anxiety:
r = .42).
Control variables
Knowledge of the Dutch language was assessed by
means of two items. The first asked participants
whether or not they had taken Dutch courses
during their curriculum. The second asked partici-
pants to estimate their competence in Dutch on a
scale ranging from 1 (= very bad) to 5 (= very good).
Results
Ten participants were excluded from the analyses
because they did not take any Dutch courses
during their high school years and were thus
potentially personally impacted by the controver-
sial policy. The competence in Dutch was similar
across conditions, F(2,51) = 1.09, ns, and did not
differ from the mid-point of the scale, M = 2.89,
t(53) < 1, ns. All subsequent analyses control for
participants’ gender. Means, standard deviations
and correlations for all variables are in Table 1. Ta
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Appraisal
We examined the impact of our manipulation by
means of a multilevel regression analysis in which
pupils were level-1 units and discussion groups
were level-2 units. All multilevel models contain a
random intercept for discussion group, which con-
trols for possible correlation (non-independence)
between the responses of pupils who were in the
same discussion group. Our data were analysed
using two orthogonal contrasts. The first “relev-
ance” contrast examined the impact of the relevance
of the topic of discussion and opposed the condition
in which the topic of the discussion was irrelevant
(coded –2) to the two conditions in which the topic
of the discussion concerned the controversial policy
(coded 1). The second “identity” contrast concerned
the identity endorsed by participants in the relevant
condition and compared the condition in which
participants had been led to categorise themselves as
an individual (coded –1) to the one in which
participants had been led to categorise themselves
as a group member (coded 1). Participants who
discussed the irrelevant topic were coded “0” on the
identity contrast.
As expected, participants in the relevant dis-
cussion conditions found the decision more unfair
than those in the irrelevant discussion condition,
b = 0.38, p = .03. The identity contrast was not
significant, b = –0.18, p = .53. In other words, the
perception of unfairness was less intense in the
individual irrelevant discussion condition (M =
4.83, SD = 1.88) than in both the individual
relevant discussion condition (M = 6.12, SD =
1.45) and the group member relevant discussion
condition (M = 6.00, SD = 1.30).
Our manipulation had no impact on future
expectancy, motivational relevance, other-agency
or situational coping, all ps > .13. An unexpected
effect was found on emotional coping. The relev-
ance contrast was not significant, b = –0.03, p =
.84, but the identity contrast was, b = 0.65, p = .02.
Participants in the group member relevant condi-
tion had higher emotional coping potential (M =
6.00, SD = 0.79) than participants in the individual
irrelevant condition (M = 5.53, SD = 1.28) and in
the individual relevant discussion one (M = 4.82,
SD = 2.16).
Emotional reactions
The effects of our manipulation on emotions were
analysed using the same contrast codes as above. In
line with our hypotheses, participants in the
relevant discussion conditions reported more anger
and less happiness than participants in the irrelev-
ant discussion condition, b = 0.33, p = .09 and b =
–0.38, p = .003, respectively, although the effect on
anger fell short of conventional significance (for all
emotion means, see Table 2). The identity contrast
was not significant for anger, b = –0.18, p = .59, or
for happiness, b = 0.05, p = .81. For anxiety and
sadness, neither the relevance nor the identity
contrast proved significant (all ps > .27).
Because the gender distribution was not
balanced, we conducted our analyses while con-
trolling for gender. As it turns out, when we
excluded gender from the analysis of anger, the
relevance contrast came out significant, b = 0.41,
p = .04, and the identity contrast did not, b = 0.05,
p = .86. Turning to happiness, excluding gender
from the analysis had the relevance contrast
remain significant, b = –0.36, p = .006, and the
identity contrast remain non-significant, b = 0.11,
p = .59. We come back to the potential impact of
gender in our discussion.
Also, the effect of our manipulation on anger
and happiness did not change when we included
participants’ individual level of Dutch as a covari-
ate, confirming that participants were indeed using
a social, and not merely an individual, perspective.
Interestingly, though, this analysis revealed that
participants’ competence in Dutch was related to
their level of anger such that lower competence led
to more anger, b = –0.61, p = .01.
Mediational analysis
Our next analysis focused on the mediational role
of appraisals. In particular, unfairness is an
important appraisal involved in anger, and so we
tested whether there was an indirect effect of the
relevance of the discussion through unfairness
on anger. Perceived unfairness predicted anger,
YZERBYT, KUPPENS, MATHIEU
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b = 0.55, p < .001, and adding unfairness to the
model decreased the relevance contrast from b =
0.33 to b = 0.14. To test the indirect effect, we
used the empirical-M test (MacKinnon, Lock-
wood, & Williams, 2004) because it performed
well in a simulation study using multilevel data
similar to the data of our study (Pituch, Stapleton,
& Kang, 2006). The empirical-M test confirmed
that the indirect effect was significant, 0.21, 95%
CI [0.03; 0.44]. Of interest, the experience of
happiness was unrelated to perceived unfairness
and the impact of the relevance manipulation did
not change as a function of taking perceived
unfairness into account.
Attributed emotions
We analysed the emotions attributed to group
members using the same multilevel analyses and
contrasts as above. Our manipulation had no effect
on the emotional reactions attributed to the group
members (all ps > .15).
Discussion
Participants perceived more unfairness when they
discussed the relevant topic (including group
concerns) than when the topic of their discussion
concerned some other aspect of their future life as
college students. The effect of the relevance of the
discussion topic was in the predicted direction for
both anger and happiness, albeit only marginally
so for anger. In line with our hypothesis, we found
a significant indirect effect of relevance through
unfairness on anger. This pattern replicates earlier
research in which such mediation was obtained
(e.g., Kuppens et al., 2013; Yzerbyt et al., 2003)
and is consistent with the importance of the
unfairness appraisal to (group-based) anger (e.g.,
Kuppens, Van Mechelen, Smits, & De Boeck,
2003; H. J. Smith & Kessler, 2004).
The present data thus provide encouraging
evidence that discussing a controversial issue with
another group member altered the appraisal of the
event and, as a consequence, the emotions
reported about the event. Importantly, the mere
encounter with a fellow future college student and
the instruction to discuss personal options pertain-
ing to their student status did not engender the
same reactions as the ones observed in the two
other conditions. As a matter of fact, although the
future choice of a specific subject in higher
education is an issue that is of interest to all
students, it is not by definition a topic that affects
students as a group. In sharp contrast, when the
discussion clearly pertained to the policy, a topic
that affects all students as a group (i.e., is a group
concern), it would appear as if a more group-based
perspective on the controversial issue came to the
fore. Although the results proved somewhat less
Table 2. Appraisal and emotion means as a function of experimental condition (Experiment 1;with standard deviations in
parentheses)
Individual irrelevant Individual relevant Group relevant
Appraisals Motivational relevance 4.35a (1.69) 4.59a (2.72) 4.55a (1.82)
Motivational congruency 1 4.00a (2.03) 4.18a (2.01) 3.50a (2.31)
Motivational congruency 2 5.24a (1.20) 5.35a (1.62) 5.20a (1.61)
Other-agency 5.24a (1.25) 5.47a (1.50) 5.70a (1.26)
Situational coping potential 4.56a (1.63) 4.76a (1.60) 4.80a (1.79)
Emotional coping potential 5.53ab (1.28) 4.82a (2.16) 6.00b (0.79)
Future expectancy 4.47a (1.23) 4.00ab (1.84) 3.15b (1.66)
Unfairness 4.82a (1.88) 6.12b (1.45) 6.00b (1.30)
Emotions Anger 3.62a (1.96) 4.82ab (1.88) 5.00b (1.67)
Happiness 2.38a (1.69) 1.09b (0.37) 1.25b (0.60)
Sadness 2.91a (1.62) 2.32a (1.21) 2.70a (1.41)
Anxiety 4.12a (1.59) 4.12a (1.97) 4.18a (2.01)
Note: Different superscripts indicate significant differences at .05 (one-tailed).
INTERACTION AND GROUP-BASED EMOTIONS
39COGNITION AND EMOTION, 2016, 30 (1)
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
CL
 Se
rv
ice
 C
en
tra
l d
es
 B
ibl
iot
hè
qu
es
] a
t 0
2:2
6 0
2 D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
5 
strong than expected, the global pattern suggests
that interaction with group members of the kind
that was triggered in the individual relevant
discussion condition on the one hand and the
initial categorisation in terms of group member-
ship on the other had comparable effects and led
to similar group-based emotions.
Instructive as these data may be, Experiment 1
had a series of shortcomings. Several of these
limitations relate to our decision to avoid as much
as possible participants who were directly and
personally concerned by the emotion-eliciting
event. This criterion is important if one ambitions
to unambiguously demonstrate the emergence of
group-based, as opposed to individual, emotions
(Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998;
for more detailed arguments, see Kuppens &
Yzerbyt, 2014; Yzerbyt, 2006; Yzerbyt et al.,
2003).
A first aspect concerns the number of partici-
pants. Because we wanted to exclude participants
who might feel directly threatened by the policy,
we dropped all participants who had not taken
Dutch classes during high school on top of those
who were not Belgian citizens or not native
French speakers. The consequence is that 24% of
our original participants had to be discarded. In
addition, the attrition led to an unequal distribu-
tion of gender across conditions and allowed a
gender effect to interfere with our predicted
pattern. As indicated, if gender is dropped from
the analyses, the effect of the relevance of the
discussion on anger is significant. In light of these
considerations, and because we have no theoretical
hypothesis with respect to the impact of gender on
the predicted pattern, we conducted a second
study in which we tried to secure a substantially
larger number of participants along with a possibly
more balanced distribution of male and female
participants.
A second issue has to do with participants’
competence in Dutch. Participants indicated being
moderately uncertain regarding their knowledge of
Dutch (M = 2.89, SD = 1.02, on a 1–5 scale). This
possibly interfered with the emergence of a
uniquely group-based emotion. Although includ-
ing Dutch knowledge in the regression model did
not alter the impact of the manipulation, indi-
vidual concerns may have played a role in people’s
reactions. As a matter of fact, our data revealed
that a lower level of knowledge in Dutch was
related not only to more anger, r = –.39, p = .004,
but also to more anxiety, r = –.46, p = .001 and
even more sadness, r = –.37, p = .007. No relation
emerged for happiness. Clearly, one would want a
context where personal concerns enter the picture
even less. To this end, we decided to turn to
schools where the proportion of pupils who had
taken Dutch in their curriculum would be mark-
edly higher.
A final, more methodological, limitation is that
Experiment 1 informs us about the impact of the
discussion that took place among the group
members essentially by comparing different
groups. Still, it is important to have unambiguous
evidence on the role of explicit social categorisa-
tion and social interaction in people’s perspectives
on emotional events. This can be better done by
collecting longitudinal data. One obvious strategy
to address this issue would be to have participants
indicate their reaction to the controversial issue
both before and after the discussion. To the extent
that explicit social categorisation has an impact, we
expect participants led to categorise themselves as
group members to adopt a group-based perspect-
ive even before the discussion. For participants
initially led to categorise themselves as individuals,
a group-based perspective should only be observed
after the discussion. This is the core hypothesis
tested in Experiment 2.
EXPERIMENT 2
Experiment 2 was modelled after Experiment 1
but this time participants reported their emotions
both before and after the discussion. In order to
recruit participants with better Dutch skills, we
included a school located close to the school
selected for Experiment 1 but where a higher
proportion of students had taken Dutch classes in
their curriculum. Additionally, we turned to a
school that was closer to the linguistic border
YZERBYT, KUPPENS, MATHIEU
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where pupils would presumably be better in
Dutch.
Our prediction was twofold. First, we predicted
that anger, and possibly other negative emotions,
would be more pronounced in the group member
identity condition than in the individual identity
conditions before the discussion. Second, once the
discussion had taken place, we expected more
intense negative emotions in the group member
identity condition and the “individual identity,
relevant discussion” condition, compared to the
“individual identity, irrelevant discussion”
condition.
As a means to further illuminate the pheno‐
menology of the participants, we include a series of
additional measures about participants’ feelings
and cognitions during the interaction. We
expected stronger feelings of proximity to the
interaction partner, identification with future col-
lege students and behavioural intentions to defend
future college students after a relevant compared to
an irrelevant discussion. Because of time con-
straints, questions about appraisals were dropped.
Method
We report how we determined our sample size, all
data exclusions, all manipulations and all measures
in the study (See Table 3).
Participants
One hundred and ten high school pupils (64
females, mean age = 17.48) took part in the
experiment during class periods. Again, the num-
ber of participants was constrained by the decision
of two school principals to make classes available
during specific periods of time. Nine participants
were excluded because they were not native French
speakers or were not Belgian.
Procedure and design
The procedure and scenario were similar to
Experiment 1 with the exception that participants
also reported their emotional reactions before the
discussion right after reading the instructions and
the fake newspaper article. All instructions asked
participants to answer these questions as indivi-
duals in the two individual conditions and as
future college students in the group member
condition. Participants were then invited to find
their discussion partner. The discussion happened
as in Experiment 1, meaning that participants
either discussed the newspaper article (relevant
condition) or their own experience with college
administration and choice of studies (irrelevant
condition). After five minutes of discussion,
participants were instructed to come back to their
own questionnaire to answer the emotion ques-
tions and all other measures.
Emotional reactions
Eight emotional items were used to tap the four
basic emotions of anger (angry, revolted, r = .73),
anxiety (anxious, preoccupied, r = .75), sadness
(depressed, resigned, r = .43) and happiness
(joyful, satisfied, r = .83). They were all answered
on 7-point scales ranging from 1 (= not at all) to
7 (= completely). The same items were used for
the emotions attributed to other future college
students (anger: r = .69; anxiety, r = .72; sadness,
r = .61; happiness, r = .76), the emotional reaction
after the discussion (anger: r = .73; anxiety, r = .79;
sadness, r = .29; happiness, r = .88) and the
emotions attributed to future college students after
the discussion students (anger: r = .79; anxiety,
r = .82; sadness, r = .67; happiness, r = .85).
Feeling and cognitions during the interaction
Several questions tapped participants’ feelings and
thoughts during the discussion. All questions
started with the following probe: “During the
social interaction with my partner, …”. We first
asked participants to report the level of proximity
with their partner (i.e., “I felt close to my
partner”). Four questions dealt with identification
(e.g., “I felt close to the other future college
students” and “I felt that I was a good represent-
ative of all future college students”, α = .76).
Finally, one question asked about participants’
intentions to defend the viewpoint of future
college students. In fact, all these measures were
correlated and in order to simplify analyses and
INTERACTION AND GROUP-BASED EMOTIONS
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results, we analysed them as a single index of
whether participants have taken on a group-based
identity (α = .81).
Control variables and manipulation check
Individual knowledge of Dutch was measured by
asking whether participants took Dutch courses
during high school and by inviting them to rate
their competence in Dutch on a scale ranging from
1 (= very bad) to 5 (= very good). Participants also
answered a manipulation check question assessing
whether they discussed the newspaper article.
Results
Control variables and manipulation check
Confirming the fact that we had selected schools
where the level of knowledge in Dutch was
generally higher than in Experiment 1, only one
participant was excluded because he never took
any Dutch course and was thus personally con-
cerned by the policy. Also, the self-reported level
of knowledge in Dutch (M = 3.40, SD = 0.91) was
higher than what had been observed in Experi-
ment 1 (M = 2.89, t(99) = 5.59, p = .0001).
Moreover, the two schools that took part in
Experiment 2 did not differ from each other in
their level of knowledge in Dutch, F(1,98) < 1, ns.
Inclusion of the school factor in subsequent
analyses did not alter the finding and so this
factor will not be discussed further. Finally, in
contrast to Experiment 1, the relation between
participants’ level of knowledge in Dutch and their
emotional reactions after the discussion was mar-
ginally significant for anxiety, r = –.19, p = .06,
and not significant for the other emotions, all rs
falling between –.12 and .11, ns.
As expected, participants in the “individual
identity, irrelevant discussion” condition talked
much less about the newspaper excerpt (M =
3.28, SD = 2.13) than those in the “individual
identity, relevant discussion” condition (M = 5.76,
SD = 1.58) or in the “group identity, relevant
discussion” condition (M = 6.24, SD = 0.92), b =
0.89, p < .001, the latter conditions not differing
from each other, b = 0.25, p = .30.T
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Reactions before the discussion
We tested the impact of our experimental manip-
ulation on the emotions that participants reported
before the discussion by regressing each emotional
index on a contrast-coded predictor, while control-
ling for gender. The identity contrast opposed the
“group member identity, relevant discussion” condi-
tion (coded 2) to both the “individual identity,
relevant discussion” and the “individual identity,
irrelevant discussion” conditions (coded –1). We
also included a relevance contrast as ameans to check
for possible differences between these conditions.
In line with predictions, participants in the
group member identity condition reported more
anger and anxiety than participants in the indi-
vidual identity conditions, b = 0.32, p = .002, and
b = 0.37, p = .004, respectively (see Table 4 for all
means). Making salient participants’ social identity
as future college students also led to marginally
more sadness, b = 0.15, p = .07. None of the
emotions revealed the presence of differences for
the relevance contrast. As in Experiment 1,
including individual knowledge of Dutch as a
covariate did not change any of the effects.
The results for attributed emotions were similar
as for own emotions. Participants in the group
member identity condition attributed more anger,
b = 0.36, p < .001; more anxiety, b = 0.30, p =
.004; and tangentially more sadness, b = 0.16, p =
.11, to other future college students than partici-
pants in the individual identity conditions.
Reactions after the discussion
Before examining the impact of the discussion on
the emotional reactions proper, we tested the
success of our discussion manipulation. As a
matter of fact, participants who discussed the
controversial topic should have their social identity
activated. We can investigate this by analysing the
indicator of group-based identity, which comprises
identification, feelings of closeness to the interac-
tion partner and intentions to defend the view-
point of future college students. To this end, we
relied on the same contrast codes as in Experiment
1. That is, the relevance contrast opposed the
“individual identity, irrelevant discussion” condi-
tion (coded –2) to both the “individual identity,
relevant discussion” and the “group member iden-
tity, relevant discussion” conditions (coded 1).
Similarly, the identity contrast now opposed the
“individual identity, relevant discussion” condition
(coded –1) to the “group member identity, relev-
ant discussion” condition (coded 1), while the
“individual identity, irrelevant discussion” condi-
tion was coded 0. Because the discussion might
have created non-independence between the dis-
cussion partners, we again relied on multilevel
analysis as in Experiment 1.
In line with the idea that the relevant discus-
sion led participants to a stronger endorsement of
the perspective of the group than the irrelevant
discussion, the relevance contrast proved signifi‐
cant, b = 0.21, p = .02. Participants in the “group
member identity, relevant discussion” (M = 4.48,
Table 4. Emotion means before and after discussion as a function of experimental condition (Experiment 2;with standard
deviations in parentheses)
Individual irrelevant Individual relevant Group relevant
Before discussion Anger 2.19a (1.43) 2.41a (1.38) 3.35b (1.28)
Happiness 2.19a (1.30) 2.23a (1.82) 2.19a (1.52)
Sadness 1.98ab (1.30) 1.59a (.88) 2.36b (1.19)
Anxiety 2.88a (1.74) 2.88a (1.91) 3.87b (1.65)
After discussion Anger 1.89a (1.20) 2.53ab (1.55) 3.01b (1.49)
Happiness 2.61a (1.51) 2.21a (1.74) 2.38a (1.90)
Sadness 1.59a (1.15) 1.94ab (1.10) 2.10a (1.02)
Anxiety 2.38a (1.72) 2.97ab (1.66) 3.57b (1.68)
Note: Different superscripts indicate significant differences at .05 (one-tailed).
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SD = 1.23) and the “individual identity, relevant
discussion” conditions (M = 4.63, SD = 0.94)
reported a more group-based identity compared to
those in the irrelevant discussion condition (M =
3.94, SD = 1.20). The identity contrast was not
significant, b = –0.04, p = .80, confirming the fact
that the more explicit (group identity) and the
more implicit (individual identity and relevant
discussion) manipulation of social identity acti-
vated social identity in similar ways. These find-
ings support our contention that discussing about
the group-relevant controversial topic activated
participants’ social identity.
Turning to our main dependent variable, i.e.,
the emotional reactions, and in line with predictions,
the relevance contrast proved significant for anger,
b = 0.28, p = .03, and anxiety, b = 0.33, p = .01,
confirming that participants reported more anger
and anxiety after a relevant than after an irrelevant
discussion (see Table 4). The identity contrast for
anger, b = 0.21, p = .32, and anxiety, b = 0.35, p =
.11, was not significant. No significant effect
emerged on happiness or sadness (all ps > .26),
although the pattern for happiness was similar to
the one in Experiment 1. Inclusion of participants’
individual knowledge of Dutch in the regression
model (as a covariate) did not alter these findings.
Regarding emotions attributed to other future
college students, the relevance contrast was margin-
ally significant for anger, b = 0.27, p = .08,
showing that participants tended to attribute
more anger to other future college students after
a relevant than after an irrelevant discussion. For
the other emotions, the relevance contrast was not
significant (all ps > .25). Unexpectedly, the
identity contrast was significant for anxiety, b =
0.47, p = .05, showing that participants attributed
more anxiety to other future college students when
their group member identity had been made
salient before the discussion.
In order to gain more insight into the process
by which group-based emotions emerge during
social interaction, namely the emergence of group-
based concerns, we calculated correlations between
anger and anxiety (i.e., the emotions that were
affected by the relevant discussion) and the other
variables that were measured after the discussion,
for the relevant discussion condition only (see
Table 5). Anger and anxiety correlated positively
with feeling close to one’s discussion partner,
intentions to defend the viewpoint of future
college students and identification. Thus, group-
based emotions were related to how participants
saw not only their relation with their discussion
partner, but also their relation with the wider
group whose interests were at stake.
Emotional change
We predicted that the emotions before the
discussion would only be based on the way
participants were led to categorise themselves. In
contrast, we hypothesised that the emotions after
the discussion would be the consequence of
whether participants did or did not discuss the
controversial policy that targeted their group
members. We therefore expect participants first
led to categorise themselves as individuals and
then asked to discuss the controversial issue with
Table 5. Correlations between anger, anxiety, and other variables, relevant conditions only (n = 67; Experiment 2)
1 2 3 4 5 6
1 Anger before discussion 1
2 Anger after discussion .68** 1
3 Anxiety before discussion .28* .19 1
4 Anxiety after discussion .18 .32** .79** 1
5 Closeness to discussion partner .13 .26* .20 .31** 1
6 Intentions to defend the viewpoint of future college students .16 .28* .30* .31* .17 1
7 Identification with future college students .18 .25* .30* .28* .33* .66**
*p < .05; **p < .01.
YZERBYT, KUPPENS, MATHIEU
44 COGNITION AND EMOTION, 2016, 30 (1)
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
CL
 Se
rv
ice
 C
en
tra
l d
es
 B
ibl
iot
hè
qu
es
] a
t 0
2:2
6 0
2 D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
5 
their partner to show a shift in relevant emotions,
compared to other participants. We did not expect
an emotional shift for participants that were led to
categorise themselves as group members from the
start, because their emotional level was already
high even before the discussion. This hypothesis
can be tested by testing whether the change in
emotional intensity is larger in the individual
relevant condition than in the other conditions.
We therefore calculated an emotion change score
by subtracting the emotion before the discussion
from that after the discussion. The emotional
change contrast was coded 2 for the “individual
identity, relevant discussion” condition and –1 for
the other two conditions. A second, complemen‐
tary, contrast was coded 1 for the “group identity,
relevant discussion” condition and –1 for the
“individual identity, irrelevant discussion” condi-
tion, with the “individual identity, relevant discus-
sion” condition coded 0.
The emotional change contrast distinguishing
the “individual identity, relevant discussion” con-
dition from the other two conditions was signific-
ant for sadness, b = 0.22, p = .004, and marginally
significant for anxiety, b = 0.17, p = .06, and for
anger, b = 0.15, p = .10. In other words, relative to
the other conditions, participants in the individual
relevant condition reported more intense negative
emotions after than before the discussion. The
increase itself was small (.12, .09 and .35 for
anger, anxiety and sadness, respectively) but it
contrasted with the overall decrease in negative
emotions after the discussion in the other condi-
tions (see Smith & Postmes, 2009, for a similar
overall decline in the intensity of the reaction after
a group discussion). The complementary contrast
did not reach significance (all ps > .48).
Reactions during the discussion
Because the questions pertaining to the experi-
enced proximity with the interaction partner, their
identification with the other future college stu-
dents and their intentions to defend the viewpoint
of future college students formed a reliable scale
(α = .81), we computed a global score indexing the
degree of activation of a group identity. In line
with the idea that the relevant discussion led
participants to a stronger endorsement of the
perspective of the group, the post-discussion
relevance contrast proved significant, b = 0.21,
p = .02, whereas the complementary identity
contrast, b = –0.04, p = .80, did not.
Discussion
Experiment 2 confirmed and extended the results
of Experiment 1. Before the discussion, group-
based anger and anxiety were stronger for those
participants whose identity as future college stu-
dents had been made salient compared to the
other conditions. Importantly, the two individual
identity conditions did not differ from each other
at this moment. The discussion had a clear impact.
As a matter of fact, group-based anger and anxiety
were not only stronger when participants had not
only discussed the relevant as opposed to the
irrelevant topic but also eliminated any difference
with those participants whose common identity
with the victims of the policy had been empha-
sised from the outset of the experiment.
This second experiment thus more clearly
showed that explicitly emphasising the social
identity or having people discuss a group-relevant
issue and share their views about the event with
other group members have similar consequences as
far as group-based emotions are concerned. As a
set, the questions pertaining to the way our
participants saw themselves in relation to their
interaction partner or the other future college
students and wanted to defend the group’s views
revealed that the discussion had made the group
identity significantly more prevalent when it
concerned a group-relevant as opposed to an
irrelevant topic. The data confirm that those
participants who took part to a relevant discussion
clearly adopted the viewpoint of the group of
future college students.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The ambition of the present research was to
investigate the conditions under which emotions
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with respect to some event may reflect group
concerns rather than individual concerns, allowing
for group-based emotions to emerge (Kuppens &
Yzerbyt, 2014). In doing so, we intended to go
beyond the existing literature that explicitly
manipulates participants’ social identity and to
examine the role of social interaction among group
members about a group-relevant event. Building
upon earlier work conducted in our laboratory (for
a review, see Yzerbyt & Kuppens, 2013), we relied
on a situation in which emotions would indeed be
felt on behalf of a group rather than related to
personal worries. Specifically, we examined emo-
tional reactions to a new governmental initiative
that would not affect the participants themselves
but concerned a group of persons whom they
could easily consider as ingroup members.
First, replicating earlier findings both Experi-
ments 1 and 2 showed that when participants’
common group membership with the victims of
the policy was initially made salient, this led to
emotions that proved to be in line with the group’s
perspective. In particular, Experiment 2 showed
that, compared to the remaining participants,
those falling in the group member identity condi-
tion reported feeling more anger and anxiety and
attributed more anger and anxiety to the other
members of the group before the discussion even
started. Second, in two additional experimental
conditions, participants either discussed the new
controversial policy (relevant discussion) or
another related topic that did not affect group
concerns (irrelevant discussion). Crucially, and as
hypothesised, discussing the specific policy with
another group member led to a similar pattern as
the one observed in the salient group membership
condition. In both experiments, group-based
anger was stronger after the relevant than after
the irrelevant discussion (although only marginally
so in Experiment 1), and anger did not differ as a
function of whether participants’ social identity
had initially been made salient or not. In other
words, group-based emotions can be elicited by
either making participants’ social identity explicitly
salient or by activating group concerns by discuss-
ing a group-based concern. The comparison with
the emotions reported in the irrelevant discussion
condition shows that the effects are not merely due
to any interaction with other group members, but
depend on the topic of the discussion. Only when
the discussion is about group concerns, do we see a
similar pattern of results as when one’s social
identity is made salient. Such an importance of the
context and topic of the discussion is entirely
consistent with research on the role of the social
context in the emergence of stereotypes (Haslam
et al., 1998; Smith & Postmes, 2011; Stott &
Drury, 2004; Thompson et al., 2000).
We argued that both explicitly emphasising a
social identity and implicitly activating social
identity in an interaction may intensify emotional
reactions because both contexts increase social
identity salience. Several additional findings of
the studies presented here confirm the key role of
social identity salience in our explanation of the
effect of social interaction. Turning to Experiment
1, participants in the relevant discussion condition,
just like those in the social identity condition,
reported that they found the decision more unfair
than in the irrelevant discussion condition. Impor-
tantly, and in line with other findings in the
literature on emotions (Frijda et al., 1989; C. A.
Smith & Kirby, 2001) and intergroup emotions
(Iyer & Leach, 2008; Kuppens et al., 2013;
Yzerbyt & Kuppens, 2013), the effect on anger
was mediated by unfairness: Participants not only
felt emotions on behalf of the victims but they also
shared their cognitive perspective. Because our
participants were not individually affected by the
new policy, this appraisal of unfairness is a group-
based appraisal, that is, a consequence of viewing
the world through a group lens (Kuppens &
Yzerbyt, 2014).
Convergent evidence can be found in Experi-
ment 2. First, the relevant group discussion
globally led to a more group-based perspective in
terms of feelings of closeness, identification and
intentions to defend the viewpoint of group
members, showing that the group of future college
students indeed became more important to our
participants. These reactions converge to suggest
that the impact of communicating the relevant
event with ingroup members on the emergence of
group-based emotions is due to participants’
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embracing a group perspective. Interestingly, in a
related set of studies (Kuppens et al., 2013), we
relied on a thought-listing procedure and found
that the causal link involving appraisals and
emotions such as the one obtained in the relevant
discussion condition only emerged when partici-
pants also explicitly mentioned group membership
and group concerns, again stressing the key role of
social identity in the process.
As proposed here, a possible explanation for the
effect of social interaction with group members is
that during the interaction, individuals come to
realise that they all belong to the same group with
the same concerns and that they can all take a
similar perspective on the issue by embracing the
group’s point of view. A desire to reach group
consensus can thus be solved by focusing on the
similarities between those who interact (Blumer,
1958; Mead, 1934). Everybody expresses an
opinion but those thoughts and emotions that
are expressed and endorsed most are those on
which group members share a common perspect-
ive. This can only occur when their common
group membership is relevant to the discussion
topic. If the group identity does not provide
common ground, there is no reason for it to
become salient during the discussion. This is why
the discussion on a topic that was not related to
group concerns did not lead to group-based
emotions.
To be sure, this account does not mean that
other processes cannot also be at work. In fact, to
the extent that the discussion pertains to an event
that preoccupies the participants, several phenom-
ena can enter the picture that could contribute to
exacerbate and shape their emotional reactions.
Building on various theoretical and empirical
efforts that looked at the way emotions unfold in
social contexts (for a review, see Parkinson,
Fischer, & Manstead, 2004), one could think of
such processes as contagion, polarisation or even
informational and normative social influence and
it stands to reason that a host of mutual feedback
processes are at work between the members of the
discussion group (Manstead & Fischer, 2001).
In our view, these various processes are not
mutually exclusive nor are they problematic from
the point of view of the present social categorisa-
tion perspective. This is because they derive from
having—at the same time that they contribute to
making—participants realise that they share sim-
ilar concerns and the same predicament. Together,
they help shape a common experience and facilit-
ate the emergence of group-based appraisals and
their associated group-based emotions.
To the extent that the above reasoning holds,
perhaps the most striking and somewhat ironic
lesson from the present research efforts is not so
much about what happens in the individual
relevant discussion condition. Rather, our data go
a long way to inform us about what likely takes
place in people’s minds when they are explicitly
asked to contemplate the event from the viewpoint
of their group membership, in the group member
identity condition. Our findings concerning the
emotions attributed to the other group members
before the discussion suggest that people in the
group member identity condition contemplate
possible reactions of other group members,
thereby setting the stage for some sort of “sym-
bolic” contagion and “symbolic” polarisation, to
take but these two processes. In all likelihood, this
is how the social influence of other group mem-
bers can operate whenever some specific social
identity is made salient?
The present work examined the impact of
discussing a group-relevant policy with an ingroup
member and argued that this likely generates
group-based emotions that are comparable to
those following the more explicit activation of
social identity. An intriguing question is whether a
discussion with an outgroup member would also
contribute to generate group-based appraisals and,
in turn, facilitate the experience of group-based
emotions. This is an interesting question for future
research but several lines of work suggest a positive
answer. As a matter of fact, the mere salience of
the outgroup in the context has been found to
favour an intergroup as opposed to an intragroup,
i.e., individual, orientation on the part of social
perceivers. For instance, research on group per-
ception reveals that prior consideration of the
outgroup exacerbates the perception of ingroup as
a homogeneous whole (Castano & Yzerbyt, 1998;
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Simon, 1992). In light of this, we would argue
that the discussion partner need not necessarily be
an ingroup member to contribute to the emer-
gence of group-based emotions. In fact, compared
to a discussion with an ingroup member, a
discussion with an outgroup member about a
controversial, indeed conflictual, issue would prob-
ably trigger group-based appraisals and, in turn,
group-based emotions even more easily.
Of course, although we gladly stress the
resemblance between allowing for social interac-
tion to take place and providing an a-priori
intergroup context, we do not want to imply that
these two situations amount to strictly the same
thing and that they should always lead to com-
parable emotional reactions. The discussion insti-
gated in our experiments only lasted five minutes,
and real-world interactions often involve much
longer exchanges of verbal and non-verbal cues in
the context of repeated contacts. In fact, we
suspect that within-group interaction in more
ecologically valid situations can often lead to
more extreme reactions than in our experiments,
and possibly stronger group-based reactions than
in “isolated” social identity contexts examined in
earlier work. This makes it all the more important
to further study the life of emotions in social
interaction settings.
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